A literatura negra feminina é pouco utilizada no contexto escolar da educação básica. Entretanto, ela pode provocar reflexões acerca das desigualdades sociais e do papel da mulher negra na sociedade brasileira. Assim, este artigo objetiva refletir acerca da relevância da literatura de Conceição Evaristo no panorama social e acadêmico, pois seus contos abordam a representação do feminino a partir de mulheres negras e denunciam as hierarquias quanto aos papéis de gênero em uma sociedade marcada pelo patriarcalismo. Portanto, tomaremos como aportes (...) teóricos a Lei 11.645/08 e as reflexões de estudiosos como: bell hooks (2017) com a educação transgressora; Kabengele Munanga (2008) com a problematização do racismo em sala de aula; Miriam Alves (2011) com o rompimento de estereótipos; Djamila Ribeiro (2021) com o lugar de fala para romper com o silenciamento, entre outros. A metodologia é um relato de experiência com roda de conversa sobre o conto “Isaltina Campo Belo”, de Conceição Evaristo (2016), inserido no livro Insubmissas lágrimas de mulheres, com a 1ª série do ensino médio em uma escola pública. Logo, a atividade de leitura com literatura negra feminina, no contexto educacional, pode levar o estudante à reflexão de inclusão ou exclusão no panorama literário afro-brasileiro e africano. (shrink)

Palavras Mágicas: solução instantânea para questões pedagógicas? Resumo: O objetivo desse artigo é analisar, com base no aporte teórico-epistemológico da hermenêutica objetiva, a presença, a razão e utilização das palavras mágicas no contexto escolar, especialmente nas relações estabelecidas entre os alunos e professores. Para tanto, o cartaz “Palavras Mágicas”, uma imagem captada em uma escola pública do ensino fundamental, no município de São Carlos – SP, em 2018, foi reconstruído empiricamente e interpretado por um grupo de pesquisadores brasileiros e um (...) estrangeiro. O significado histórico-cultural das palavras mágicas, bem como o questionamento acerca da pertinência da adoção de práticas “pedagógicas mágicas” na escola, foi contrastado com o sentido pedagógico da formação escolar. Os resultados da análise indicam que a pedagogia não pode ser praticada de forma mágica, mediante a instantaneidade e instrumentalização de suas ações, pois se assim o for, estaríamos decretando o fim da Pedagogia. Palavras-chave: Palavras mágicas; Pedagogia; Formação; Teoria crítica; Hermenêutica objetiva. Magic Words: instant solution to pedagogical questions? Abstract: The aim of this article is to analyze, based on the theoretical-epistemological contribution of objective hermeneutics, the presence, reason and use of magic words in the school context, especially in the relationships established between students and teachers. To this end, the poster “Palavras Mágicas”, an image captured in a public elementary school in the municipality of São Carlos - SP, in 2018, was reconstructed empirically and interpreted by a group of Brazilian researchers and a foreigner. The historical-cultural meaning of magic words, as well as the questioning about the pertinence of adopting “magical pedagogical” practices in school, were contrasted with the pedagogical sense of school formation. The results of the analysis indicate that pedagogy cannot be practiced in a magical way, by means of the instantaneous and instrumentalization of its actions, because if it happened, we would be decreeing the end of Pedagogy. Keyword: Magic words; Pedagogy; Formation; Critical theory; Objective hermeneutics. Palabras mágicas: ¿solución instantánea a cuestiones pedagógicas? Resumen: El objetivo de este artículo es analizar, con base en la contribución teórico-epistemológica de la hermenéutica objetiva, la presencia, la razón y el uso de palabras mágicas en el contexto escolar, especialmente en las relaciones establecidas entre estudiantes y docentes. Con este fin, el póster "Palavras Mágicas", una imagen capturada en una escuela primaria pública en el municipio de São Carlos - SP, en 2018, fue reconstruida empíricamente e interpretada por un grupo de investigadores brasileños y un extranjero. El significado histórico-cultural de las palabras mágicas, así como el cuestionamiento sobre la pertinencia de adoptar prácticas "mágicas pedagógicas" en la escuela, se contrasta con el sentido pedagógico de la formación escolar. Los resultados del análisis indican que la pedagogía no se puede practicar de manera mágica, por medio de la instantánea y la instrumentalización de sus acciones, porque de ser así, estaríamos decretando el fin de la pedagogía. Palabra clave: Palabras mágicas; Pedagogía; Formación; Teoría crítica; Hermenéutica objetiva. Data de registro: 13/09/2020 Data de aceite: 05/08/2021 Financiamento de Pesquisa: FAPESP. (shrink)

ObjectiveThis study aims to analyze sociohistorically how the normative patterns of hegemonic masculinity produced impacts on men’s health/mental health in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsA qualitative study from a socio-historical perspective was conducted with 50 men based on an online survey. A semistructured form was applied. The data were analyzed by the Collective Subject Discourse method, interpreted in the light of the context of epidemic disease and hegemonic masculinity.ResultsThe experience of the pandemic exposed the normative patterns of masculinities from (...) the consummation of acts representative of the pandemic context, which incited men to deny the existence of COVID-19 disease and to delay the understanding and adoption of measures to protect and control COVID-19. As a repercussion, men presented conflicts in the regulation of emotions; presented emotional suppression; were more reactive; felt threatened regarding the loss of the role of family provider, virility; and revealed a sense of invulnerability, added to the weakening of self-care.ConclusionThe discourse revealed that the men’s behaviors are consistent with the characteristics of hegemonic masculinity, but express signs of recognition that this behavior causes harm to themselves and their health. (shrink)

Compreender a atual crise global pelo panorama ambiental requer reconhecimento, disposição e vontade para pensar e criar possibilidades de uma ação justa e em concordância com o paradigma ecológico, em prol da mudança desta realidade. Dentre várias ações em andamento a educação para a sustentabilidade acena com perspectivas reais e concretas. Esta pesquisa se insere no âmbito da investigação desta educação, e teve como objetivo identificar a espiritualidade e qual sua tipologia através da analise sob a perspectiva do paradigma ecológico (...) e da espiritualidade, no curso Eco design em sustentabilidade do Programa Gaia Education realizado na Ecovila Terra Una/MG. O programa foi criado em 2005 pela Rede de Educadores Globais de Ecovilas para uma Terra Sustentável, passando a ser considerado complemento padrão pela ONU para a Década de Educação para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável 2005\2014. Baseado na Pedagogia de Aprendizagem Vivencial, o Programa Gaia Education tem a finalidade de fornecer instrumentos\técnicas que possibilitem aos seus alunos aprender diferentes práticas sustentáveis, baseadas nas experiências comunitárias e nas relações que elas estabelecem com o ambiente, sendo rural ou urbano. A metodologia adotada consistiu na pesquisa bibliográfica de fontes primarias e secundárias dos materiais do curso e de obras de referencia na área da sustentabilidade e espiritualidade, no âmbito das Ciências da religião, da teologia, da educação, das ciências ambientais e sociais. Realizou-se a análise sistemática e hermenêutica dos discursos. Ao final da pesquisa, constatou-se a identificação da espiritualidade presente no curso, assim como outras perspectivas de praticas espirituais e de dialogo como referência para o desenvolvimento da educação para a sustentabilidade de forma integral. Palavras chave: Ecologia. Paradigma ecológico. Educação. Sustentabilidade. Espiritualidade. Gaia Education. Ciências da Religião. (shrink)

A floresta amazônica é um espaço disputado por diferentes atores, que possuem distintas formas de entendimento e relações com a floresta. Essas diferenças se tensionam, pois se de um lado, a terra e seus seres naturais são entendidos como ‘recursos’ que podem ser explorados a partir de uma lógica privada, por outro lado, para o povo Moxihatëtë thëpë da amazônia - povo Yanomami-, os seres humanos são coabitantes da terra-floresta, entendida como um ser vivo composto de incontáveis seres (...) vivos. Os seres humanos não possuem privilégios ontológicos em relação aos demais seres. Para o Yanomami é estranha a possibilidade de se pensar o espaço/território a partir de um viés de propriedade e/ou exploração. Assim, considerando a medida emergencial e humanitária decretada para salvaguardar ao povo Yanomami, devido aos efeitos da exploração da mineração ilegal, agudizada durante os últimos quatro anos pelo desprezo do poder público, o objetivo desta escrita é ‘denunciar’ discursos colonialistas que permeiam a Educação Matemática como campo de pesquisa para ‘anunciar’, no sentido freiriano (1997), modos decoloniais de praticar a pesquisa e o ensino de matemáticas que promovam a justiça social e outras relações com a Mãe Terra. Este interesse nasce do nosso lugar como mulheres latinoamericanas, como educadoras matemáticas e formadoras de professores nos cursos de Formação Intercultural para Educadores Indígenas (UFMG), Educação do Campo (UFMG), Licenciatura em Pedagogia (UFMG/FEUSP), Licenciatura integrada em Ciências, Matemática e Linguagens (UFPA) e Licenciatura em Matemática (UFMG/FEUSP). Colocamos a crise sanitária e humanitária Yanomami no foco da Educação Matemática, por entendermos a importância do campo tomar partido pela vida, pela luta e pela resistência dos povos da floresta que sofrem até hoje com o padrão de poder instituído pela modernidade/colonialidade. Problematizamos a invisibilização dos conhecimentos sobre a floresta dos povos originários nos currículos de matemática -escolares e universitários- visto que contribui com a manutenção de políticas econômicas capitalistas que encontram fundamento na dicotomia entre humanos e outros seres da natureza. Elegemos o “Bem Viver” dos povos originários como uma política ontológica, econômica, social e educacional outra, que promove a decolonização dos modos imperialistas de ocupar a Mãe Terra e de se produzir conhecimento. (shrink)

Após a onda de desconstrução do pensamento que marcou a última década da filosofia entre nós, talvez tenha chegado o tempo do refluxo do pensamento, a saber, o tempo de debater a existência de um cânone filosófico brasileiro, justamente quando a legitimidade da ciência e, sobretudo da filosofia, é posta em questão. O ponto pede atenção: desde o século XVI, há ensino de filosofia nestas terras, então, quais seriam as razões para afirmar ou negar a existência de uma filosofia brasileira? (...) Para responder à questão, na primeira parte deste artigo, situamos uma ideia de cânone filosófico à luz da produção acadêmica nacional; na segunda, analisamos a possibilidade de um conceito restrito e um amplo de cânone passando da literatura à filosofia; na terceira, comparamos cinco pares antitéticos de definições filosóficas de autores brasileiros e, finalmente, analisamos como a produção filosófica dentro do Sistema Nacional de Pós-Graduação (SNPG) tem viabilizado ou não o debate acerca da legitimidade da filosofia brasileira. (shrink)

CADERNOS DE FILOSOFIA EXTRAVAGANTE - ANTÓNIO TELMO Vários Autores Um dos sinais do Quinto Império é que ainda há andorinhas O provérbio diz que uma andorinha não faz a Primavera Mas eu acho que faz Enquanto houver um homem onde resida a espiritualidade há sempre um princípio do Quinto Império António Telmo Este terceiro volume dos Cadernos de Filosofia Extravagante é o primeiro que se publica após a partida de António Telmo, que os imaginou, concebeu e fundou Constitui por isso, (...) na íntegra, um preito de homenagem ao autor da História Secreta de Portugal, nele se inserindo, bem a propósito, as actas do Colóquio A Obra e o Pensamento de António Telmo, realizado em 14 e 15 de Fevereiro de 2011, no Palácio da Independência, em Lisboa, por iniciativa do Instituto de Filosofia Luso-Brasileira, documento a que acrescem alguns testemunhos de amigos que, por uma ou outra razão, não puderam participar naquela comemoração, e duas entrevistas, uma das quais se encontrava por publicar, pelo filósofo concedidas na última década Por outro lado, nestas páginas o leitor poderá ainda encontrar dois escritos do autor de O Bateleur – um poema e um conto – nunca antes dados ao papel em letra de forma E, o que talvez seja mais, uma série significativa de correspondência epistolar até agora mantida inédita, tendo o filósofo por destinatário São missivas de Álvaro Ribeiro, José Marinho, Agostinho da Silva, Dalila Pereira da Costa e António Quadros, definindo um arco temporal que vai da publicação de Arte Poética, em 1963, à de Filosofia e Kabbalah, em 1990 Quase trinta anos de uma vida filosófica singular em que, a cada passo, são bem notórias a admiração e a amizade que mestres e condiscípulos lhe dedicam Autores- António Telmo, Pedro Martins, Renato Epifânio, Américo Rodrigues, Helena Estriga, António Braz Teixeira, Joaquim Domingues, Abel de Lacerda Botelho, Roque N Brás de Oliveira, M N Vieira, Luís Paixão, António Carlos Carvalho, Cynthia Guimarães Taveira, Rui Lopo, António Quadros Ferro, Carlos Aurélio, António Cândido Franco, Rodrigo Sobral Cunha, Carlos Vargas, Manuel Ferreira Patrício, Pedro Sinde, Paulo Santos, Pedro Paquim Ribeiro, Maurícia Teles da Silva, J Pinharanda Gomes, António Quadros, Avelino de Sousa, Elísio Gala, José Paulo Ribeiro Albuquerque, Helder Cortes, Eduardo Aroso, Isabel Xavier, Jesus Carlos, Álvaro Ribeiro, José Marinho, Agostinho da Silva, Dalila Pereira da Costa. (shrink)

Resenha da obra: ZUIN, Antônio Álvaro Soares; COSTA, Belarmino Cesar Guimarães da; GOMES, Luiz Roberto; LASTÓRIA, Luiz Antônio Calmon Nabuco (org.). Teoria crítica, formação cultural e educação: homenagem a Bruno Pucci. Piracicaba: Editora Unimep, 2018. 396p.

According to non-conceptualist interpretations, Kant held that the application of concepts is not necessary for perceptual experience. Some have motivated non-conceptualism by noting the affinities between Kant's account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.

Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their naïve realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. For they took naïve realism about perceptual experience to be incompatible with Kant’s claims about the way the understanding is necessarily involved in perceptual consciousness. This essay seeks to situate a naïve realist account of visual experience within a recognisably Kantian framework by arguing that a naïve realist account of visual experience is compatible with the claim that the understanding is necessarily involved in the (...) perceptual experience of those rational beings with discursive intellects. The resultant view is middle way between recent conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of Kant, holding that the understanding is necessarily involved in the kind of perceptual consciousness that we, as rational beings, enjoy whilst allowing that the relations of apprehension which constitute perceptual consciousness are independent of acts of the understanding. (shrink)

An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value (...) for the latency for conscious sensation of threshold skin stimuli. Backward enhancement is not suitable for inferring this latency. For determining temporal relations between stimuli that correspond to subjects' reports, theendof cerebral Minimum Train Duration should be used as reference, rather than its onset. Results of coupling peripheral and cortical stimuli are explained by a latency after the cortical Minimum Train Duration, having roughly the same duration as the latency for supraliminal skin stimuli. Results of coupling peripheral stimuli and stimuli to medial lemniscus (LM) are explained by a shorter LM latency and/or a longer peripheral latency. This interpretation suggests a 230 ms minimum value for the latency for conscious sensation of somatosensory near-threshold stimuli. The backward referral hypothesis, as formulated by Libet, should not be retained. Long readiness potentials preceding spontaneous conscious or nonconscious movements suggest that both kinds of movement are nonconsciously initiated. The validity of Libet's measures of W and M moments (Libet et al., 1983a) is questionable due to problems involving latencies, training, and introspective distinction of W and M. Veto of intended actions may be initially nonconscious but dependent on conscious awareness. (shrink)

Libet's (2000) arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient. The claims of my critical review (Gomes, 2008) do not suffer with his new statements.

Phenomenal particularism is the view that particular external objects are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. It is a central part of naïve realist or relational views of perception. We consider a series of recent objections to phenomenal particularism and argue that naïve realism has the resources to block them. In particular, we show that these objections rest on assumptions about the nature of phenomenal character that the naïve realist will reject, and that they ignore the full (...) resources that naïve realism has to offer in explaining phenomenal character. (shrink)

We are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects must be related to an objective world. But many have worried about their starting points. ‘One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning’, the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg writes. ‘To (...) say cogito is already too much as soon as one translates it as I am thinking. To assume the I, to postulate it, is a practical requirement.’ Lichtenberg raises a question here about our entitlement to think of ourselves as the agent of our thinking. Sometimes thoughts strike us like lightning. When this happens, we are their patient. It is central to our self-conscious lives that this is the exception: we are first and foremost the agents of our thinking. What right do we have to think of ourselves as such? The Practical Self argues that self-consciousness requires faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking. But faith can be undermined and it can be sustained. And this provides us with a connection to the world since our faith in ourselves as the agents of our thinking is sustained by practices which relate us to other thinkers. Self-conscious subjects must have faith in themselves as thinking agents and it is our relations to the others which sustain this faith. Self-consciousness connects us to a world of others. (shrink)

1. Introduction The readiness potential was found to precede voluntary acts by about half a second or more (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Kornhuber (1984) discussed the readiness potential in terms of volition, arguing that it is not the manifestation of an attentional processes. Libet discussed it in relation to consciousness and to free will (Libet et al. 1983a; 1983b; Libet, 1985, 1992, 1993). Libet asked the following questions. Are voluntary acts initiated by a conscious decision to act? Are the physiological (...) facts compatible with the belief that free will determines our voluntary acts? What is the role of consciousness in voluntary action? In this paper I will discuss these questions and the answers that Libet gave to them. (shrink)

Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.

James Van Cleve has argued that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. And this falls short of Kant’s aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the Deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve’s objection can help illuminate the structure of the B Deduction, and it suggests (...) an interesting reason why the rewriting might have been thought necessary. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Gray, Knickman, and Wegner present three experiments which they take to show that people perceive patients in a persistent vegetative state to have less mentality than the dead. Following on from Gomes and Parrott, we provide evidence to show that participants' responses in the initial experiments are an artifact of the questions posed. Results from two experiments show that, once the questions have been clarified, people do not ascribe more mental capacity to the dead than (...) to PVS patients. There is no reason to think that people perceive PVS patients as more dead than dead. (shrink)

It is argued that contraposition is valid for a class of natural language conditionals, if some modifications are allowed to preserve the meaning of the original conditional. In many cases, implicit temporal indices must be considered, making a change in verb tense necessary. A suitable contrapositive for implicative counterfactual conditionals can also usually be found. In some cases, the addition of certain words is necessary to preserve meaning that is present in the original sentence and would be lost or changed (...) in the contrapositive without them. A distinction is made between adding new meaning and adding new words to preserve existing meaning. For concessive conditionals and relevance conditionals, however, no valid contrapositive can be found. They do not belong to the class of contraposable conditionals, which can be independently defined. Difficult cases are also discussed in which the contradictory of the consequent semantically entails the truth of the antecedent. In such cases the content of the antecedent is implicit in the meaning of the consequent. Contraposition becomes possible if what is implicit in the original consequent is made explicit in the contrapositive antecedent. (shrink)

A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality , calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. , may be “corrected,” taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are (...) favored, but her explanation of peripheral–lemniscal couplings is found to be unconvincing. Trevena and Miller's article unsuccessfully tries to rescue a dualist interactionist view. Libet's method of timing intentions is thoroughly criticized. (shrink)

In the section ‘Unity and Objectivity’ of The Bounds of Sense, P. F. Strawson argues for the thesis that unity of consciousness requires experience of an objective world. My aim in this essay is to evaluate this claim. In the first and second parts of the essay, I explicate Strawson's thesis, reconstruct his argument, and identify the point at which the argument fails. Strawson's discussion nevertheless raises an important question: are there ways in which we must think of our experiences (...) if we are to self-ascribe them? In the third part of the essay, I use Kant's remarks concerning the passivity of experience to suggest one answer to this question: in self-ascribing experiences, we must be capable of thinking of them as passive to their objects. This can be used to provide an alternative route from unity to objectivity. (shrink)

In the essays which make up The Sovereignty of Good, Iris Murdoch gives us a picture of moral life in which ‘the metaphor of vision [is] almost irresistibly suggested’. This chapter aims to clarify the role played by the metaphor of vision in Murdoch’s philosophical thinking. I’ll examine two different things which might be meant by the term ‘moral vision’: vision of moral things or vision which is itself moral. The suggestion will be that whilst both capture something important about (...) Murdoch’s work, each may mislead about what is distinctive in her views. For Murdoch, I shall suggest, there is no distinctively moral vision. There is only vision: a loving gaze directed upon the reality of others. (shrink)

Can the experience of great art play a role in our coming to understand the ethical framework of another person? In this article I draw out three themes from Iris Murdoch’s ‘The Sovereignty of Good’ in order to show the role that communal attention to works of art can play in our ethical lives. I situate this role in the context of Murdoch’s wider philosophical views.

Lucy Allais seeks to provide a reading of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories which is compatible with a nonconceptualist account of Kant’s theory of intuition. According to her interpretation, the aim of the Deduction is to show that a priori concept application is required for empirical concept application. I argue that once we distinguish the application of the categories from the instantiation of the categories, we see that Allais’s reconstruction of the Deduction cannot provide an answer to Hume’s problem (...) about our entitlement to use a priori concepts when thinking about the objects of empirical intuition. If the Deduction is to provide a response to Hume, Allais’s interpretation must be rejected. (shrink)

For Kant, the human cognitive faculty has two sub-faculties: sensibility and the understanding. Each has pure forms which are necessary to us as humans: space and time for sensibility; the categories for the understanding. But Kant is careful to leave open the possibility of there being creatures like us, with both sensibility and understanding, who nevertheless have different pure forms of sensibility. They would be finite rational beings and discursive cognizers. But they would not be human. And this raises a (...) question about the pure forms of the understanding. Does Kant leave open the possibility of discursive cognizers who have different categories? Even if other discursive cognizers might not sense like us, must they at least think like us? We argue that textual and systematic considerations do not determine the answers to these questions and examine whether Kant thinks that the issue cannot be decided. Consideration of his wider views on the nature and limits of our knowledge of mind shows that Kant could indeed remain neutral on the issue but that the exact form his neutrality can take is subject to unexpected constraints. The result would be an important difference between what Kant says about discursive cognizers with other forms of sensibility and what he is in a position to say about discursive cognizers with other forms of understanding. Kantian humility here takes on a distinctive character. (shrink)

Resumo Palavras-chave Keywords : Narrative production. Authorship. Language. Memory. Identity. : This article comprises a detailed report on a project of narrative production, which is being conducted, every semester, with students entering the Languages course, on the Portuguese Language subject.The project consists of a process of production, reading, and rewriting of small narratives, which, at the end of the term, are gathered and organized by each student in order to assemble their own book craftily. The proposal came forth as a (...) strategy to try to solve problems related to the little familiarity with writing and to the lack of authorship marks. The engagement in the production of contextualized and guided narratives for a determined purpose has disclosed, at the end of each semester, similar results: pleasure to write, read and expose the produced texts for group discussions; concern with the interlocutor; presence of authorship marks; perception of discursive qualities on the text itself and on the text of others; concern with the adequacy of the writing to linguistic conventions; confidence on the writing process; perception of oneself as part of a history and as a result of multiple intersubjectivities; praise of one’s own life history and of one’s ancestors. The project finds itself based on enunciation theories. : Produção de narrativa. Autoria. Linguagem. Memória. Identidade. : Este artigo constitui-se do relato de um projeto de produção de narrativa que vem sendo desenvolvido, semestralmente, com alunos ingressantes no curso de Letras, na disciplina de Língua Portuguesa. O projeto consiste em um processo de produção, leitura e reescritura de pequenas narrativas com as quais, ao fim do semestre, cada aluno organiza e confecciona artesanalmente o seu próprio livro. A proposta surgiu como estratégia para tentar solucionar problemas relacionados à pouca familiaridade com a escrita e à ausência de marcas de autoria. O enfoque na produção de narrativas contextualizadas e orientadas para um determinado fim tem revelado, no fim de cada semestre, resultados semelhantes: prazer de escrever, de ler e de submeter à discussão do grupo os textos produzidos; preocupação com o interlocutor; presença de marcas de autoria; percepção de qualidades discursivas no próprio texto e no texto do outro; preocupação com a adequação da escrita às convenções linguísticas; segurança em relação à escrita; percepção de si como parte de uma história e como fruto de intersubjetividades múltiplas; valorização da própria história de vida e da de seus antepassados. O trabalho encontra suporte em teorias da linguística da enunciação. (shrink)

This article is concerned with social and interactional processes that simplify pragmatic acts of intention attribution. The empirical focus is a series of interactions among DeafBlind people in Seattle, Washington, where pointing signs are used to individuate objects of reference in the im-mediate environment. Most members of this community are born deaf and slowly become blind. They come to Seattle using Visual American Sign Language, which has emerged and developed in a field organized around visual modes of access. However, as (...) vision deteriorates, links be-tween deictic signs and the present, remembered, or imagined environment erode in idiosyncratic ways across the community of language-users, and it becomes increasingly difficult for partici-pants to converge on objects of reference. In the past, DeafBlind people have addressed this problem by relying on sighted interpreters. Under the influence of the recent “pro-tactile” movement, they have turned instead to one another to find new solutions to their referential prob-lems. Drawing on analyses of 120 hours of videorecorded interaction and language-use, detailed fieldnotes collected during twelve months of sustained anthropological fieldwork, and more than 15 years of involvement in this community in a range of capacities, I show how DeafBlind peo-ple are generating new and reciprocal modes of access to their environment, and how this pro-cess is aligning language with context in novel ways. I propose two mechanisms that can account for this process: deictic integration and embedding in the social field. I argue that together, these interactional and social mechanisms yield a deictic system set to retrieve a restricted range of values from the extra-linguistic context, thereby attenuating the cognitive demands of intention-attribution and narrowing the gap between DeafBlind minds. (shrink)

‘How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were?’ So asks Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse. It is this question, rather than any concern about pretence or deception, which forms the basis for the philosophical problem of other minds. Responses to this problem have tended to cluster around two solutions: either we know others’ minds through perception; or we know others’ minds through a form of inference. In the (...) first part of this paper I argue that this debate is best understood as concerning the question of whether our knowledge of others’ minds is based on perception or based on evidence. In the second part of the paper I suggest that our ordinary ways of thinking take our knowledge of others’ minds to be both non- evidential and non-perceptual. A satisfactory resolution to the philosophical problem of other minds thus requires us to take seriously the idea that we have a way of knowing about others’ minds which is both non-evidential and non-perceptual. I suggest that our knowledge of others’ minds which is based on their expressions – our expressive knowledge - may fit this bill. (shrink)

In this paper I distinguish two ways of raising a sceptical problem of others' minds: via a problem concerning the possibility of error or via a problem concerning sources of knowledge. I give some reason to think that the second problem raises a more interesting problem in accounting for our knowledge of others’ minds and consider proposed solutions to the problem.

We are able to think of empirical objects as capable of existing unperceived. What explains our grasp of this conception of objects? In this paper I examine the claim that experience explains our understanding of objects as capable of existing unperceived with reference to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. I argue that standard accounts of experience’s explanatory role are unsatisfactory, but that an alternative account can be extracted from the first Critique – one which relies on Kant’s transcendental idealism.

In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.

Claims that necessary and sufficient conditions are not converse relations are discussed, as well as the related claim that If A, then B is not equivalent to A only if B . The analysis of alleged counterexamples has shown, among other things, how necessary and sufficient conditions should be understood, especially in the case of causal conditions, and the importance of distinguishing sufficient-cause conditionals from necessary-cause conditionals. It is concluded that necessary and sufficient conditions, adequately interpreted, are converse relations in (...) all cases. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether 'even if A, B' is pragmatically polysemic, so that a nonconcessive conditional may have 'even if', and whether concessive conditionals, pragmatically defined, can fail to have 'even if' or a non-temporal 'still'. Different paraphrases are used to help elucidate pragmatic meanings. A theory of the pragmatic meanings of concessive and implicative conditionals is presented. The semantic meaning of 'even if' and the question of whether concessive conditionals imply the truth of their consequents are also discussed.

Seven informants , aged between 32 and 42, who had experienced at least one career change in their lives were interviewed about the history of their career trajectories. The interviews were analyzed according to the systematic and systemic reflexivity proposed by the phenomenological tradition: description, reduction and interpretation. The findings point to the need for professional guidance practice giving attention not only to professional information but also to a reflection of individual and work-related values. This would help both young people (...) and adults to see their own objectives more clearly and to be capable of formulating their own career plans and following them through. (shrink)

The present paper is about the author’s current research on children’s education in urban contexts. It departs from the rising offer of programmes for school children in out-of-school contexts (e.g. museums, libraries, science centres). It asks what makes these practices educational (and not just interesting, entertaining and/or audience building). Based on Biesta ( 2006a , 2010 ) theory of education, the author frames and analyses the educational characteristics of, and possibilities of articulating, in and out-of-school educational practices. This paper aims (...) at understanding if the occasional outing from primary school premises promotes interruptions in the humanist foundations of school. In order to analyse relations between different institutions and professionals (to be) engaged in educational activities and programmes, Nóvoa ( 2002 , 2009 ) essays will be brought to the discussion, namely his conception of the ‘Public Space of Education’—as a space where culture, education, arts, sports and leisure are shared responsibilities, and where diverse institutions are networked aiming towards societal pluralism. I argue for the possibility of using cities’ public spaces as contexts with a worldly quality to complexify children’s education. Nevertheless, I draw attention to the unbearable educational lightness that these practices may carry if they do not go beyond the praise of chance; as well as to their unsustainable weight if they perpetually repeat school’s normal orders and add up rational discourses. (shrink)

Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.

In a provocative article published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Susan Pockett argues for the plausibility of considering consciousness as an epiphenomenon of neural activity. This means that consciousness, though caused by the brain, would not in its turn have any role in the causation of neural activity and, consequently, of behaviour. Critical for her argument is the distinction she makes between 'consciousness per se' and 'the neural processing that accompanies it' . In her discussion, though, the author begs (...) the question concerning whether there really is such 'consciousness itself, as distinct from the neural processing that goes with it' . If consciousness as it exists happens not to be distinct from some sort of neural processing, then Pockett's 'consciousness per se' has no causal effect simply because it does not exist. (shrink)

In the first part of this chapter, I summarise some of the issues in the philosophy of mind which are addressed in Kant’s Critical writings. In the second part, I chart some of the ways in which that discussion influenced twentieth-century analytic philosophy of mind and identify some of the themes which characterise Kantian approaches in the philosophy of mind.

Hodgson’s (Journal of Consciousness Studies, 12 (1), 2005) defense of the plain person’s view that free will exists in conscious voluntary action is discussed. His position against the view that human action is automatically determined is favored, but his view that free will is incompatible with natural causation is countered. Eccles’ hypothesis to account for the presence of a readiness potential prior to a conscious decision to act now is discussed. It is argued that it is possible to preserve what (...) is good in a plain person’s concept of free will in a way that is compatible with natural causation. (shrink)

John McDowell’s original motivation of disjunctivism occurs in the context of a problem regarding other minds. Recent commentators have insisted that McDowell’s disjunctivism should be classed as an epistemological disjunctivism about epistemic warrant, and distinguished from the perceptual disjunctivism of Hinton, Snowdon and others. In this paper I investigate the relation between the problem of other minds and disjunctivism, and raise some questions for this interpretation of McDowell.

The prima facie heterogeneity between psychical and physical phenomena seems to be a serious objection to psychoneural identity thesis, according to many authors, from Leibniz to Popper. It is argued that this objection can be superseded by a different conception of consciousness. Consciousness, while being conscious of something, is always unconscious of itself . Consciousness of being conscious is not immediate, it involves another, second-order, conscious state. The appearance of mental states to second-order consciousness does not reveal their true nature. (...) Psychoneural identity can thus be considered a valid hypothesis. Related views of Kant, Freud, Shaffer, Bunge and others are considered. “Naive psychical realism” is criticised. Consciousness of mental events is considered as the result of the action of a cerebral system that observes the neural events hypothetically identical to mental events. The theory combines a materialist view with a due consideration of subjective experience. (shrink)

The Brazilian imaginary, impregnated by an ambiguous relationship between the forces of "good" and "evil", caused some Pentecostal churches that spread here to seek this ambiguity in order to attract believers. Emphasizing the spiritual dispute in the form of a "war" in his speeches, Pentecostalism was able to organize the Brazilian religious imaginary, finding in some portions of society the resonance of its message. This systematization of the religious imaginary, which finds in the "Spiritual War" the way of manifesting itself (...) in the Pentecostal milieu, also brings with it important elements of the cultural-religious milieu. The aim of this work is to demonstrate the repercussion of the adaptation of the Brazilian religious imaginary within what is called the "war against the demons" in the Universal Church Of the Kingdom of God. Pentecostal discourse has adapted to a reality where inequality and social ills are transformed by the "Spiritual Battle" into primary causes of the suffering that affects individuals and prevents them from prospering. (shrink)

Tradução do artigo "The postulate of immediate empiricism" do filósofo pragamatista americano John Dewey. Publicado originalmente em The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, Vol. 2, No. 15, pp. 393-399.

Volume 40, Issue 3, August 2019, Page 298-303.